Linear sketches are powerful algorithmic tools that turn an ndimensional input into a concise lower-dimensional representation via a linear transformation. Such sketches have seen a wide range of applications including norm estimation over data streams, compressed sensing, and distributed computing. In almost any realistic setting, however, a linear sketch faces the possibility that its inputs are correlated with previous evaluations of the sketch. Known techniques no longer guarantee the correctness of the output in the presence of such correlations. We therefore ask: Are linear sketches inherently non-robust to adaptively chosen inputs? We give a strong affirmative answer to this question. Specifically, we show that no linear sketch approximates the Euclidean norm of its input to within an arbitrary multiplicative approximation factor on a polynomial number of adaptively chosen inputs. The result remains true even if the dimension of the sketch is d = n − o(n) and the sketch is given unbounded computation time. Our result is based on an algorithm with running time polynomial in d that adaptively finds a distribution over inputs on which the sketch is incorrect with constant probability. Our result implies several corollaries for related problems including p -norm estimation and compressed sensing. Notably, we resolve an open problem in compressed sensing regarding the feasibility of 2 / 2 -recovery guarantees in presence of computationally bounded adversaries.
has led to the emergence of new fields, including compressed sensing, data stream algorithms and distributed functional monitoring. A unifying technique in these fields is the use of linear sketches. This technique involves specifying a distribution π over linear maps A : n → r for a value r n. A matrix A is sampled from π. Then, in the online phase, a vector x ∈ n is presented to the algorithm, which maintains the "sketch" Ax. This provides a concise summary of x, from which various queries about x can be approximately answered. The storage and number of linear measurements (rows of A) required is proportional to r. The goal is to minimize r to well-approximate a large class of queries with high probability.
Applications of Linear Sketches. In compressed sensing the goal is to design a distribution π so that for A ∼ π, given a vector x ∈ n , from Ax one can output a vector x for which x − x p C x tail(k) q , where x tail(k) denotes x with its top k coefficients (in magnitude) replaced with zero, p and q are norms, and C > 1 is an approximation parameter. The scheme is considered efficient if r k · poly(log n). There are two common models, the "for all" and "for each" models. In the "for all" model, a single A is chosen and is required, with high probability, to work simultaneously for all x ∈ n . In the "for each" model, the chosen A is just required to work with high probability for any fixed x ∈ n .
A related model is the turnstile model for data streams. Here an underlying vector x ∈ n is initialized to 0 n and undergoes a long sequence of additive updates to its coordinates of the form x i ← x i + δ. The algorithm is presented the updates one by one, and maintains a summary of what it has seen. If the summary is a linear sketch Ax, then given an additive update to the i-th coordinate, the summary can be updated by adding δA i to Ax, where A i is the i-th column of A. The best known algorithms for any problem in this model maintain a linear sketch. Starting with the work of Alon, Matias, and Szegedy [3] , problems such as approximating the p-norm x p = ( n i=1 |x i | p ) 1/p for 1 p ∞ (also known as the frequency moments), the heavy hitters or largest coordinates in x, and many others have been considered; we refer the reader to [11, 16] . Often it is required that the algorithm be able to query the sketch to approximate the statistic at intermediate points in the stream, rather than solely at the end of the stream.
Other examples include distributed computing [13] and functional monitoring [5] . Here there are k parties P 1 , . . . , P k , e.g., database servers or sensor networks, each with a local stream S i of additive updates to a vector x i . The goal is to approximate statistics, such as those mentioned above, on the aggregate vector x = k i=1 x i . If the parties share public randomness, they can agree upon a sketching matrix A. Then, each party can locally compute Ax i , from which Ax can be computed using the linearity of the sketch, namely, Ax = A(x 1 + · · · + x k ). The important measure is the communication complexity, which, since it suffices to exchange the sketches Ax i , is proportional to r rather than to n.
Adaptively Chosen Inputs. One weakness with the models above is that they assume the sketching matrix A is independent of the input vector x. As pointed out in recent papers [8, 9] , there are applications for which this is inadequate. Indeed, this occurs in situations for which the result of performing a query on Ax influences future updates to the vector x. One example given in [8] is that of a grocery store, in which x consists of transactions, and one uses Ax to approximate the best selling items. The store may update its inventory based on Ax, which in turn influences future sales. A more adversarial example given in [8, 9] is that of using a compressed sensing radar on a ship to avoid a missile from an attacker. Based on Ax, the ship takes evasive action, which is viewed by the attacker, and may change the attack. The matrix A used by the radar cannot be changed between successive attacks for efficiency reasons. Another example arises in high frequency stock trading. Imagine Alice monitors a stream of orders on the stock market and places her own orders depending on statistics based on sketches. A competitor Charlie might have a commercial interest in leading Alice's algorithm astray by observing her orders and manipulating the input stream accordingly. The question of sketching in adversarial environments was also introduced and motivated in the beautiful work of Mironov, Naor and Segev [15] who provide several examples arising in multiparty sketching applications. Even from a less adversarial point of view, it seems hard to argue that in realistic settings there will be no correlation between the inputs to a linear sketch and previous evaluations of it. Resilience to such correlations would be a desirable robustness guarantee of a sketching algorithm. A deterministic sketching matrix, e.g., in compressed sensing one that satisfies the "for all" property above, would suffice to handle this kind of feedback. Unfortunately, such sketches provably have much weaker error guarantees. Indeed, if one wants the number r of measurements to be on the order of k · poly(log n), then the best one can hope for is that for all x ∈ n , from Ax one can output x for which x − x 2
Our Results
We resolve the above open question in the negative. In fact, we prove a much more general result about linear sketches. All of our results are derived from the following promise problem GapNorm(B): for an input vector x ∈ n , output 0 if x 2 1 and output 1 if x 2 B, where B > 1 is a parameter. If x satisfies neither of these two conditions, the output of the algorithm is allowed to be 0 or 1. Theorem 1.1 (Informal version of Theorem 3.12). There is a randomized algorithm which, given a parameter B 2 and oracle access to a linear sketch that uses at most r = n − O(log(nB)) rows, with high probability finds a distribution over queries on which the linear sketch fails to solve GapNorm(B) with constant probability.
The algorithm makes at most poly(rB) adaptively chosen queries to the oracle and runs in time poly(rB). Moreover, the algorithm uses only r "rounds of adaptivity" in that the query sequence can be partitioned into at most r sequences of non-adaptive queries.
Note that the algorithm in our theorem succeeds on every linear sketch with high probability. In particular, our theorem implies that one cannot design a distribution over sketching matrices with at most r rows so as to output a value in the range [ x 2 , B x 2 ], that is, a B-approximation to x 2 , and be correct with constant probability on an adaptively chosen sequence of poly(rB) queries. This is unless the number r of rows in the sketch is n − O(log(nB)), which agrees with the trivial r = n upper bound up to a low order term. Here B can be any arbitrary approximation factor that is only required to be polynomially bounded in n (as otherwise the running time would not be polynomial). An interesting aspect of our algorithm is that it makes arguably very natural queries as they are all drawn from Gaussian distributions with varying covariance structure.
We also note that the second part of our theorem implies that the queries can be grouped into fewer than r rounds, where in each round the queries made are independent of each other conditioned on previous rounds. This is close to optimal, as if o(r/ log r) rounds were used, the sketching algorithm could partition the rows of A into o(r/ log r) disjoint blocks of ω(log r) coordinates, and use the i-th block alone to respond to queries in the i-th round. If the rows of A were i.i.d. normal random variables, one can show that this would require a super-polynomial (in r) number of non-adaptive queries to break, even for constant B. Moreover, our theorem gives an algorithm with time complexity polynomial in r and B, and therefore rules out the possibility of using cryptographic techniques secure against polynomial time algorithms.
We state our results in terms of algorithms that output any computationally unbounded but deterministic function f of the sketch Ax. However, it is not difficult to extend all of our results to the setting where the algorithm can use additional internal randomness at each step to output a randomized function f of Ax (see Section 4).
Applications. We next discuss several implications of our main theorem. Our algorithm in fact uses only query vectors x which are O(r)-dimensional for B exp(r). Recall that for such vectors,
x p O(r 1/2 x 2 ), for all 1 p ∞. This gives us the following corollary for any p -norm. Corollary 1.2 (Informal). No linear sketch with n − ω(log n) rows approximates the p -norm to within a fixed polynomial factor on a sequence of polynomially many adaptively chosen queries.
The corollary also applies to other problems that are as least as hard as p -norm estimation, such as the earthmover distance, or that can be embedded into p with small distortion.
Via a reduction to GapNorm(B), we are able to resolve the aforementioned open question for sparse recovery, even when k = 1. Corollary 1.3 (Informal). Let C 1. No linear sketch with o(n/C 2 ) rows guarantees 2 / 2 -recovery on a polynomial number of adaptively chosen inputs. More precisely, we can find with probability 2/3 an input x for which the output x of the sketch does not satisfy x − x 2 C x tail(1) 2 .
For constant approximation factors C, this shows one cannot do asymptotically better than storing the entire input. For larger approximation factors C, the dependence of the number of rows on C in this corollary is essentially best possible (at least for small k), as we point out in Section 4.1.
Connection to Differential Privacy. How might one design algorithms that are robust to adversarial inputs? An intriguing approach is offered by the notion of differential privacy [6] . Indeed, differential privacy is designed to guard a private database D ∈ {0, 1} n (here thought of as n private bits) against adversarial and possibly adaptive queries from a data analyst. Intuitively speaking, differential privacy prevents an attacker from reconstructing the private bit string. In our setting we can think of D as the random string that encodes the matrix used by the sketching algorithm and indeed our algorithm is precisely a reconstruction attack in the terminology of differential privacy. It is known that if D is chosen uniformly at random, then after conditioning D on the output of an ε-differentially private algorithm, the string D is a strongly 2ε-unpredictable 2 random string [14] . Hence, if the answers given by the sketching algorithm satisfy differential privacy, then the attacker cannot learn the randomness used by the sketching algorithm. This could then be used to argue that the sketch continues to be correct.
An interesting corollary of our work is that it rules out the possibility of correctly answering a polynomial number of "GapNorm queries" using the differential privacy approach outlined above. This stands in sharp contrast to work in differential privacy which shows that a nearly exponential number of adaptive and adversarial "counting queries" can be answered while satisfying differential privacy [18, 10] . A similar (though quantitatively sharper) separation was recently shown for the stateless mechanisms [7] answering counting queries. While linear sketches are stateless, the model we use here in principle permits more flexibility in how the randomness is used by the algorithm so that the previous separation does not apply.
Comparison to Previous Work
While the above papers [8, 9] introduce the problem, the results they obtain do not directly address the general problem. The main result of [9] is that in the private model of compressed sensing, the 2 / 2 error guarantee is achievable with r = k · poly(log n) measurements, under the assumption that the algorithm has access to the exact value of x 2 2 as well as specific Fourier coefficients of x (or approximate values to these quantities that come from a distribution that depends only on the exact values). While in some applications this may be possible, it is not hard to show that this assumption cannot be realized by any linear sketch unless r n (nor by any low space streaming algorithm or low communication protocol). The main result in [8] relevant to this problem is that if the adversary can read the sketching matrix A, but is required to stream through the entries in a single pass using logarithmic space, then it cannot generate a query x for which the output of the algorithm on Ax does not satisfy the 2 / 2 error guarantee. This is quite different from the problem considered here, since we consider multiple adaptively chosen queries rather than a single query, and we do not allow direct access to A but rather only observe A through the outputs f (Ax i ).
We note that other work has observed the danger of using the output f (Ax) to create an input x for which the value f (Ax ) is used [1, 2] . Their solution to this problem is just to use a new sketching matrix A drawn from π, and instead query f (A x ). As mentioned, it may not be possible to do this, e.g., if x is a perturbation to x, one would need to compute A x without knowing x (since x may only be known through the sketch Ax). Other work [12, 17] has also considered the power of adaptively choosing matrices to achieve fewer measurements in compressed sensing; this is orthogonal to our work since we consider adaptively chosen inputs rather than adaptively chosen sketches.
Sketching in adversarial environments was also the motivation for [15] . However, they consider an adversarial multi-party model that is different from ours.
Our Techniques and Proof Overview
We prove our main theorem by considering the following game between two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice chooses an r × n matrix A from distribution π. Bob makes a sequence of queries x 1 , . . . , x s ∈ n to Alice, who only sees Ax i on query i. Alice responds by telling Bob the value f (Ax i ). We stress that here f is an arbitrary function here that need not be efficiently computable, but for now we assume that f uses no randomness. This restriction can be removed easily as we show later. Bob's goal is to learn the row space R(A) of Alice, namely the at most r-dimensional subspace of n spanned by the rows of A. If Bob knew R(A), he could, with probability 1/2 query 0 n and with probability 1/2 query a vector in the kernel of A. Since Alice cannot distinguish the two cases, and since the norm in one case is 0 and in the other case non-zero, she cannot provide a relative error approximation. Our main theorem gives an algorithm (which can be executed efficiently by Bob) that learns r − O(1) orthonormal vectors that are almost contained in R(A). While this does not give Bob a vector in the kernel of A, it effectively reduces Alice's row space to be constant dimensional thus forcing her to make a mistake on sufficiently many queries.
The conditional expectation lemma. In order to learn R(A), Bob's initial query is drawn from the multivariate normal distribution N(0, τId n ), where τId n is the covariance matrix, which is just a scalar τ times the identity matrix Id n . This ensures that Alice's view of Bob's query x, namely, the projection P A x of x onto R(A), is spherically symmetric, and so only depends on P A x 2 . Given P A x 2 , Alice needs to output 0 or 1 depending on what she thinks the norm of x is. The intuition is that since Alice has a proper subspace of n , she will be confused into thinking x has larger norm than it does when P A x 2 is slightly larger than its expectation (for a given τ), that is, when x has a non-trivial correlation with R(A). Formally, we can prove a conditional expectation lemma showing that there exists a choice of τ for which ¾ x∼N(0,τIdn) P A x 2 2 | f (Ax) = 1 − ¾ x∼N(0,τIdn) P A x 2 2 is non-trivially large. This is done by showing that the sum of this difference over all possible τ in a range [1, B] is noticeably positive. Here B is the approximation factor that we tolerate. In particular, there exists a τ for which this difference is large. To show the sum is large, for each possible condition v = P A x 2 2 , there is a probability q(v) that the algorithm outputs 1, and as we range over all τ, q(v) contributes both positively and negatively to the above difference based on v's weight in the χ 2 -distribution with mean r·τ. The overall contribution of v can be shown to be zero. Moreover, by correctness of the sketch, q(v) must typically be close to 0 for small values of v, and typically close to 1 for large values of v. Therefore q(v) zeros out some of the negative contributions that v would otherwise make and ensures some positive contributions in total.
Boosting a small correlation. Given the conditional expectation lemma we can find many independently chosen x i for which each x i has a slightly increased expected projection onto Alice's space R(A). At this point, however, it is not clear how to proceed unless we can aggregate these slight correlations into a single vector which has very high correlation with R(A). We accomplish this by arranging all m = poly(n) positively labeled vectors x i into an m × n matrix G and computing the top right singular vector v * of G. Note that this can be done efficiently. We show that, indeed, P A v * 1 − 1/poly(n). In other words v * is almost entirely contained in R(A). This step is crucial as it gives us a way to effectively reduce the dimension of Alice's space by 1 as we will see next.
Iterating the attack. After finding one vector inside Alice's space, we are unfortunately not done. In fact Alice might initially use only a small fraction of her rows and switch to a new set of rows after Bob learned her initial rows. We thus iterate the previously described attack as follows. Bob now makes queries from a multivariate normal distribution inside of the subspace orthogonal to the the previously found vector. In this way we have effectively reduced the dimension of Alice's space by 1, and we can repeat the attack until her space is of constant dimension, at which point a standard non-adaptive attack is enough to break the sketch. Several complications arise at this point. For example, each vector that we find is only approximately contained in R(A). We need to rule out that this approximation error could help Alice. We do so by adding a sufficient amount of global Gaussian noise to our query distribution. This has the effect of making the distribution statistically indistinguishable from a query distribution defined by vectors that are exactly contained in Alice's space. Of course, we then also need a generalized conditional expectation lemma for such distributions.
Preliminaries
Given a subspace V ⊆ n , we denote by P V the orthogonal projection operator onto the space V. The orthogonal complement of a linear space V is denoted by V ⊥ . When X is a distribution we use the notation x ∼ X to indicate that x is a random variable drawn according to the distribution X.
A linear sketch is given by a distribution M over r×n matrices and an evaluation mapping F : r×n × r → R where R is some output space which we typically choose to be R = {0, 1}. The algorithm initially samples a matrix A ∼ M. The answer to each query x ∈ n is then given by F(A, Ax). Since the evaluation map F is not restricted in any way, the concrete representation of A as a matrix is not important. We will therefore identify A with its image, an r-dimensional subspace of n (w.l.o.g. A has full row rank). In this case, we can write an instance of a sketch as a mapping f : n → R satisfying the identity f (x) = f (P A x). In this case we may write f : A → {0, 1} even though f is defined on all of n via orthogonal projection onto A.
We denote the d-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean µ ∈ d and independent coordinates with variance σ 2 ∈ by N(µ, σ 2 ) d . The statistical distance (or total variation distance) between two distributions X, Y is denoted by X − Y tv .
FINDING CORRELATIONS
The key tool in our algorithm is what we call the conditional expectation lemma. Informally, it shows that we can always find a distribution over inputs that have a non-trivially large correlation with the unknown subspace used by the linear sketch. Fix a d-dimensional linear subspace U ⊆ n . Throughout this section, we think of d as being lower bounded by a sufficiently large constant. We will consider functions of the type f : n → {0, 1} which satisfy the identity f (x) = f (P U x) for all x ∈ n . To indicate that this identity holds we will write f : U → {0, 1}. As explained in Section 1.4, we can think of these functions as instances of a linear sketch. We will not rely on this interpretation however.
Various missing proofs can be found in the full version of this paper that is available online.
Averages of χ 2 -distributions
The conditional expectation lemma requires us to understand certain weighted averages of χ 2 -distributions in d . We let ν τ : [0, ∞) → [0, 1] be the density function of a χ 2 -distribution with d-degrees of freedom and expectation τ. Note that this coincides with the density function of the squared norm of a d-dimensional Gaussian variable N(0, τ/d) d . The next lemma summarizes the properties of the χ 2 -distribution that we need. The proof is rather technical and omitted for lack of space. 
Subspace Gaussians
To state the conditional expectation lemma we introduce the notion of a subspace gaussian family. Definition 2.2 (Subspace Gaussian). Let U ⊆ n be a linear subspace of n . We say that a family of distributions G(U) = {g τ } τ∈(0,∞) is a subspace Gaussian family if (1) P U g τ is distributed like a standard Gaussian variable inside U satisfying ¾ P U g τ 2 = τ. (2) P U ⊥ g τ is a spherical Gaussian distribution that does not depend on τ and is moreover statistically independent of P U g τ .
The reader concerned about the condition P U g τ 2 = s (which has probability 0 under g τ ) is referred to the excellent article of Chang and Pollard [4] (Example 6) where it is shown how to formally justify this conditional distribution using the notion of a disintegration. Specifically, here we mean that the distributions g τ have a joint disintegration in terms of the variable P U g τ 2 . As explained in [4] , we can prove the above lemma by appealing to the factorization theorem for sufficient statistics described therein. Using the factorization theorem, the lemma follows easily from rotational symmetry of the Gaussian distribution and the definition of a subspace Gaussian.
The following definition captures the condition that f should evaluate to 1 on inputs that have large norm and should evaluate to 0 on inputs that have small norm. Definition 2.4 (Soundness). We say that a function f : U → {0, 1} is B-sound for a subspace Gaussian family G(U), where dim(U) = d, if it satisfies the requirements:
We are ready to state the Conditional Expectation Lemma.
Note that this is well-defined by Lemma 2.3. Let us first rewrite the conditional expectation as follows using Bayes' Rule:
Claim 2.6. The lemma is implied by the inequality:
Proof. Indeed, assuming the above inequality, it follows that there must be a τ ∈
Since { f (g τ ) = 1} 1, this gives us the first conclusion of the lemma. It remains to lower bound { f (g τ ) = 1} . Here we use that 
By the previous claim, it suffices to prove Equation 2. To do so we will apply Lemma 2.1. The lemma in fact directly implies the claim, if we can show that h satisfies the properties required in Lemma 2.1. It is easily verified that these properties coincide with the soundness assumption on f. Thus, The following is a one-dimensional corollary of Lemma 2.5. 
Noisy orthogonal complements
In this section we extend the conditional expectation lemma to a family of distributions that will be important to us later on. We will fix a r-dimensional subspace A ⊆ n . The family of distributions we will define next isn't subspace Gaussian on A, but rather subspace
A distribution in this family is given by a subspace V and a variance σ 2 . Intuitively, the distribution corresponds to a Gaussian distribution on the subspace V ⊥ of variance σ 2 plus a small Gaussian supported on all of n of constant variance independent of σ 2 . The formal definition is given next. Definition 2.8. Let σ > 0. Given a subspace V ⊆ A of dimension t r − 1 and let d = r − t. We define the distribution G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) as the distribution obtained from sampling g 1 ∼ N(0, σ 2 ) n , g 2 ∼ N(0, 1/4) n independently outputting g = P V ⊥ g 1 + g 2 .
Further we define the family of distributions
The next definition captures the correctness requirement on f for inputs drawn from the distribution G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ). Definition 2.10 (Correctness). We say that a function f :
We say that f is B-correct on V ⊥ if it is (ε, B)-correct for some ε 1/10(Bd) 2 .
Below we state a variant of the conditional expectation lemma for distributions of the above form. Moreover, we will remove the requirement that t r − d 0 and obtain a result that applies to any t dim(A). Lemma 2.12. Let A ⊆ n be a subspace of dimension dim(A) = r n − d 0 for some sufficiently large constant d 0 . Let V ⊆ A be a subspace of A of dimension t r. Suppose that f : A → {0, 1} is (1/10(d 0 B) 2 , B)-correct on V ⊥ . Then, there exists a scalar σ 2 ∈ [3/4, B], and a vector u ∈ A ∩ V ⊥ such that for g ∼ G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) we have for d = max{r − d, d 0 } :
Before we proceed we would like to ensure that dim(A ∩ V ⊥ ) is at least a sufficiently large constant d 0 . This can be ensured without loss of generality by considering instead a subspace A ⊇ A of dimension r + d 0 obtained by extending A arbitrarily to r + d 0 dimensions. This can be done since n r
Hence, by Lemma 2.11, we have that f is sound for the subspace Gaussian family G(A ∩ V ⊥ ). Let U = A ∩ V ⊥ . Since f (x) only depends on P A x, we can apply Corollary 2.7 to G(U) to conclude that there is τ ∈ [d, Bd] and
By definition of f the condition f (g τ ) = 1 is equivalent to f (g τ ) = 1. The condition f (g τ ) = 1 does not affect any vector that is orthogonal to A. Hence we may assume that u ∈ A ∩ V ⊥ . Also note that g τ = P A g for some g ∼ G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) with
. Moreover, f (g) = f (g τ ), and also u, g τ = u, g since u ∈ U. Hence, we have ¾ u,
. This is what we wanted to show.
Distance between subspaces
Our goal is to relate distributions of the form G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) to G(W ⊥ , σ 2 ) where V and W are subspaces. For this purpose, we consider the following distance function d(V, W) between two subspaces V, W ⊆ n :
We will show that if V and W are close in this distance measure, then the two distributions G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) and G(W ⊥ , σ 2 ) are statistically close. Recall that we denote the statistical distance between two distributions X, Y by X − Y tv . We need the following well-known fact.
Using this fact we can express the statistical distance between G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) and G(W ⊥ , σ 2 ) for two subspaces V, W in terms of the distance d(V, W).
RECONSTRUCTION ATTACK
We will next state our main theorem using the notion of a failure certificate which gives a distribution over which the sketch must fail. The motivation for the previous definition is given by the next simple fact showing that a failure certificate always gives rise to a distribution over which f does not decide the GapNorm problem up to a factor Ω(B) on a polynomial number of queries. This follows simply by sampling the distribution G(V, σ 2 ) for O((Bn) C ) times and querying the function f on each sample. Since n is sufficiently large compared to d, the norm of all queries is concentrated in the host space so that f must make a mistake on one of the samples. We note that in Section 3.3 we strengthen this concept to give a distribution where f errs with constant probability.
Our next theorem shows that we can always find a failure certificate with a polynomial number of queries. for all x ∈ n . Then, there is an algorithm that given only oracle access to f finds with probability 9/10 a failure certificate for f. The time and query complexity of the algorithm is bounded by poly(B, r) . Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled from G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) for some V ⊆ n and σ 2 ∈ (0, B].
We next describe the algorithm promised in Theorem 3.2 in Figure 1 . For t = 1 to t = r + 1 : For each σ 2 ∈ S :
1. Sample g 1 , . . . , g m ∼ G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ). Query A on each g i . Let a i = A(g i ).
2. Let s(t, σ 2 ) = 1 m m i=1 a i denote the fraction of samples that are positively labeled. If either σ 2 B/2 and s(t, σ 2 ) 1−ε, or, σ 2 2 and s(t, σ 2 ) ε, terminate and output (V ⊥ t , σ 2 ) as a purported failure certificate.
3. Otherwise let g 1 , . . . , g m be the vectors such that A(g i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [m ].
4. If m < m/100B 2 n, proceed to the next σ. Else, compute v σ ∈ n−1 as the unit norm maximizer of the objective function
Let v * denote the first vector v σ that achieved objective function (σ 2 + 1/4) + ∆ where ∆ = 1/7Br. If no such v σ was found, let V t+1 = V t and proceed to the next round.
Otherwise In each round the algorithm queries A on a sequence of queries chosen from the orthogonal complement of V t . As the dimension of V t grows larger, the oracle must make a mistake.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that n = r + 90 log(Br) by working with the first r+90 log(Br) coordinates of n . This ensures that a polynomial dependence on n in our algorithm is also a polynomial dependence on r.
For each 1 t t, let W t ⊆ A be the closest (t − 1)-dimensional subspace to V t that is contained in A. Formally, W t satisfies
Note that here we identify V t with the subspace that is spanned by the vectors contained in V t . We will maintain (with high probability) that the following invariant is true during the attack:
Invariant at step t:
Note that the invariant holds vacuously at step 1, since
Informally speaking, our goal is to show that either the algorithm terminates with a failure certificate or the invariant continues to hold. Note that whenever the invariant holds in a step t, we must have d(V t , W t ) 1 20B 4.5 n 2.5 log(Bn) 2.5 .
Applying Lemma 2.14 shows that for every σ 2 ∈ (0, B],
This observation leads to the following useful lemma. Proof. Equation 6 implies that for every σ 2 ∈ (0, B], the statistical distance between G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ) and G(W ⊥ t , σ 2 ) is at most ε. Hence, the correctness conditions from Definition 2.10 hold up to an ε-loss in the probabilities.
Let E denote the event that the empirical estimate s(t, σ 2 ) is accurate at all steps of the algorithm. Formally:
ε . We claim that {E} 1 − exp(−n). The claim follows from a standard application of the Chernoff bound, since we chose the number of samples m (Bn/ε) 2 .
Lemma 3.4. Under the condition that E occurs, the following is true: If the algorithm terminates in round t and outputs G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ), then G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ) is a failure certificate for f. Moreover, if the algorithm does not terminate in round t and the invariant holds in round t, then f is B-correct on W ⊥ .
Proof. The first claim follows directly from the definition of a failure certificate and the condition that the empirical error given by s(t, σ 2 ) is ε-close to the actual error.
The second claim follows from Lemma 3.3. Indeed by the condition E and the assumption that the algorithm did not terminate, we must have that f is (2ε, B)-correct on V ⊥ t . By Lemma 3.3, this implies that f is (3ε, B)-correct on W ⊥ t . Note that 3ε 1/10(Bn) 2 and hence f is B-correct on W ⊥ t .
Lemma 3.5 (Progress). Let t r. Assume that the invariant holds in round t and that f is B-correct on W ⊥ t . Then, with probability 1 − 1/n 2 the invariant holds in round t + 1.
We will carry out the proof of Lemma 3.5 in Section 3.2. But before we do so we will conclude the proof of Theorem 3.2 assuming that the previous lemma holds. In order to do so, we argue that if we reach the final round and the invariant holds, we have effectively reconstructed all of A. Hence, it must be the case that f is no longer correct on W ⊥ t as shown next. Lemma 3.6. Suppose that the invariant holds for t = r + 1. Then, f is not B-correct on W ⊥ t .
Proof. Since t = r + 1 and the invariant holds, we have dim(V t ) = dim(W t ) = r. On the other hand W t ⊆ A and dim(A) = r. Hence, W t = A. Therefore, the function f cannot distinguish between samples from G(W ⊥ t , 2) and samples from G(W ⊥ t , B). Thus, f must make a mistake with constant probability on one of the distributions.
Condition on the event that E occurs. Since E has probability 1 − exp(−n), this affects the success probability of our algorithm only by a negligible amount. Under this condition, if the algorithm terminates in a round t with t r, then by Lemma 3.4, the algorithm actually outputs a failure certificate for f. On the other hand, suppose that we do not terminate in any of the rounds t r. By the second part of Lemma 3.4, this means that in each round t it must be the case that f is correct on W ⊥ t assuming that the invariant holds at step t. In this case we can apply Lemma 3.5 to argue that the invariant continues to hold in round t + 1. Since the invariant holds in step 1, it follows that if the algorithm does not terminate prematurely, then with probability (1 − 1/n 2 ) r 1 − 1/n the invariant still holds at step r + 1. But in this case, W r+1 is not correct for f by Lemma 3.6 and hence by Lemma 3.4 we output a failure certificate with probability 1 − exp(−n). Combining the two possible cases, it follows that the algorithm successfully finds a failure certificate for f with probability 1 − 2/n. This is what is required by Theorem 3.2.
It therefore only remains to argue about query complexity and running time. The query complexity is polynomially bounded in n and hence also in r since we may assume that n O(r) as previously argued. Computationally, the only non-trivial step is finding the vector v σ that maximizes z
We claim that this vector can be found efficiently using singular vector computation. Indeed, let G be the m × n matrix that has g 1 , . . . , g m as its rows. The top singular vector v of G, by definition, maximizes Gv 2 = m i=1 g i , v 2 . Hence, it must also maximize the function z(v). This shows that the attack can be implemented in time polynomial in r. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Let t r. Assume that the invariant holds in round t. Further assume that f is B-correct on W ⊥ t . Recall that under these assumptions, by Equation 6, for every σ 2 ∈ (0, B],
Our goal is to show that with probability 1−1/n 2 , the invariant holds in round t + 1. To prove this claim we will invoke the conditional expectation lemma (Lemma 2.12) in the analysis of our algorithm.
Proof. By our assumption, W ⊥ t satisfies the assumptions of the conditional expectation lemma (Lemma 2.12) so that there exists u ∈
On the other hand, by Equation 7, we know that G(W ⊥ t , σ 2 ) is δ-statistically close to G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ) and that δ = o(1/B 2 n). We claim that therefore
and { f (g) = 1}
1 50B 2 r . The latter statement is immediate because f (g) ∈ {0, 1} and hence { f (g) = 1} can differ by at most δ = o(1/B 4 r log(rB)) between the two distributions. This further implies that the statistical distance between the two distributions under the condition that f (g) = 1 can only increase by a factor of 50B 2 r. Formally, for every distinguishing function R : n → [0, D], we have
On the other hand, u, g 2 > 10 B exp (− ) , by tail bounds for the χ 2 -distribution. Hence, we can truncate u, g 2 at D = 10B log(rB) without affecting either expectation by more than o(1/Br).
Br .
(9) A similar argument shows that if we change σ 2 by only o(1/B 2 n 2 ) additively, Equation 9 continues to hold up to a insignificant loss in the parameters. Hence, there existsσ 2 in our discretization for which this claim is true. Finally, since u ∈ W t ∩ A and the invariant holds for (V t , W t ), we have that P Vt u 1 − 1/B 2 n 2 . Hence, the conclusion of the lemma also holds for some u ∈ V t ∩ A up to an additive o(1/Bn) loss in the expectation.
Informally speaking, the previous lemma suggests that forσ 2 ∈ S , the vector vσ has exceptionally high objective value. Moreover, we need to show that any vector that has high objective value must be very close to the subspace V ⊥ t ∩ A. This is formally argued next. The result follows from analyzing the top singular vector of the biased Gaussian matrix obtained by arranging all positively labeled examples into a matrix. The next lemma follows from a discretization of the unit sphere with a standard Chernoff bound. Lemma 3.8. Let τ 0. Let V be a subspace of n . Let γ > 1/poly(n). Let G be the distribution over n such that for g ∼ G we have: (1) For every unit vector w ∈ V ⊥ , we have ¾ w, g 2 τ.
(2) For every two unit vectors v ∈ V, w ∈ V ⊥ , we have ¾ v, g w, g = 0.
(3) The maximum of ¾ v, g 2 over all unit vectors v ∈ V is equal to τ + ∆ for some ∆ > 1/poly(n). (4) For every unit vector u ∈ n , we have u, g 2 ξ 2 .
Draw m = O n log 2 (n)ξ 2
Lemma 3.9. With probability 1 − exp(−n), the vector v * found by the algorithm in step t satisfies
Proof Sketch. Let z * = max σ 2 ∈S z(v σ ) denote the maximum objective value achieved by any σ in round t of the algorithm. We will first lower bound z * using the information we have aboutσ * from the previous lemma. To this end, we would next like to apply Lemma 3.8 to the conditional distribution of g ∼ G(V ⊥ t ,σ 2 ) conditioned on the event that f (g) = 1. Note that g 1 , . . . , g m are uniformly sampled from this distribution. Furthermore, the probability that A outputs 1 on each sample is at least p Ω(1/B 2 n). This can be used to show that by a Chernoff bound, with probability 1 − exp(−n), we have that m pm 10 Ω B 11 n 10 log 15 (n) We will apply Lemma 3.8 with the following setting γ = 1 (Bn) 4.5 log 4 (Bn) . We need to verify various conditions of Lemma 3.8. In doing so let V = V ⊥ t ∩ A and W = V ⊥ = V t + A ⊥ . Further, let τ =σ 2 + 1/4 and ∆ be the parameter from Lemma 3.7 and let ξ 2 = O(B 2 log 2 n). With these parameters it is not difficult to show that all four conditions of Lemma 3.8 hold. Finally, to apply Lemma 3.8 for the given value of γ, ∆, and ξ 2 , we need the number of samples to be Θ n log 2 (n)ξ 2 γ 2 ∆ 2 Θ B 11 n 10 log 14 (n) = o(m ) . It then follows from Lemma 3.8 that with probability 1 − exp(−n log n), z * z(σ) 1 + ∆ 14 . On the other hand, let us call a σ 2 ∈ S , bad if for every unit vector u ∈ V ⊥ t ∩ A we have for g ∼ G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ), ¾ u, g 2 f (g) = 1 ¾ u, g 2 + ∆ 20 , where ∆ is the parameter from the previous lemma. We claim that every bad σ 2 will achieve strictly smaller objective value, i.e., z(σ) 1 + ∆/18, with probability 1 − exp(−n). This can be shown using a Chernoff bound similarly to how it is used in Lemma 3.8 except that we now use an upper bound on ¾ u, g 2 also for u ∈ V ⊥ t ∩A. Hence, the maximizer of the objective function must correspond to a σ * that satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.8 as we previously verified them forσ up to a constant factor loss in ∆. Hence, by Lemma 3.8, we must have that v * satisfies with probability 1 − exp(−n), P V ⊥ t ∩A v * 2 1 − γ . Proof. Let γ = 1/(Bn) 4.5 log 4 (Bn). By Equation 10, we have that
This means in particular that P A v * 2 1 − γ and P Vt v * 2 γ. This implies that P A v t 1 − O(γ) . We claim that this implies that d(V t+1 , W t+1 ) d(V t , W t ) + O(γ). Since this is what we want to show, it only remains to show that the first inequality holds. To that end, note that we can write
We have shown that with probability 1 − O(exp(−n)), the conditions of Lemma 3.10 are met and in this case the Invariant holds for (V t+1 , W t+1 ). This is what we needed to show in order to conclude the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Strong Failure Certificates
In this section we derive a useful extension of our theorem. Specifically we show how to find strong failure certificates. These will be distributions as before of the form G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ), but now the algorithm fails with constant probability over this distribution rather than inverse-polynomial. In fact, our later application to compressed sensing will need precisely this extension of our theorem. The proof of this extension follows from a simple direct product construction which shows how to reduce the error probability of the oracle at intermediate steps exponentially while increasing the sample complexity only polynomially. Definition 3.11 (Strong Failure Certificate). Let B 8 and let f : n → {0, 1}. We say that a pair (V, σ 2 ) is a strong failure certificate for f if V ⊆ n is a d-dimensional subspace and σ 2 ∈ [0, 2B] such that for some constant C > 0, we have n d + 10 log(n) and moreover: Either Then, there is an algorithm that with probability 1/3 and poly(B, r) adaptive oracle queries to f finds a strong failure certificate for f. Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled from G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) for some V ⊆ n and σ 2 ∈ (0, B].
Proof Sketch. Let q = O(log(Bn)). Given the function f : n → {0, 1} that is invariant under the subspace A ⊆ n , consider the function f ⊗q : qn → {0, 1} defined as
.
Note that f ⊗q is invariant under the subspace A ⊗q , i.e., the q-fold direct product of A with itself. Further note that dim(A ⊗q ) = qr qn − 90q log(Br). Hence, f ⊗q satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3.2. Now, let G(W ⊥ , σ 2 ) be the failure certificate returned by the algorithm guaranteed by Theorem 3.2. Using properties of the majority function and the distribution G(W ⊥ , σ 2 ), one can show to extract a strong failure certificate G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) for f. Specifically one can take V ⊥ to be a restriction of W ⊥ to one of the the q-coordinate blocks.
APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this section we derive various applications of our main theorem. While we have stated our results in terms of algorithms that output a (deterministic) function f of the sketch Ax, we obtain the same results for algorithms which use additional randomness to output a randomized function f of Ax. Indeed, the main observation is that our attack never makes the same query twice, with probability 1. It follows that for each possible hardwiring of the randomness of f for each possible input, we obtain a deterministic function, and can apply Theorem 3.12.
Consider the attack in Figure 1 . In each round t, we now allow the algorithm to use a new function f t : n → {0, 1} provided that f t (x) still only depends on P A x. Under this assumption, the proof of Theorem 3.2 (and thus also the one of Theorem 3.12) carries through the same way as before except that we replace f by f t in each round. What is crucial for the attack is only that the subspace A has not changed. We thus have the following theorem. Theorem 4.1. Let B 8. Let A ⊆ n be a r-dimensional subspace of n such that n r + 90 log(Br). Assume that B poly(n). Let f : n → {0, 1} be a randomized algorithm for which the distribution on outputs f (x) only depends on P A x, for all x ∈ n . Then, there is an algorithm that given only oracle access to f , which for each possible fixing of the randomness of f , finds with constant probability a strong failure certificate for f . The time and query complexity of the algorithm is bounded by poly(Br). Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled from G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) for some V ⊆ n and σ 2 ∈ (0, B]. Moreover, we may assume that for each query x ∼ G(V ⊥ t , σ 2 ) made by the algorithm in round t, the function f is allowed to depend on V ⊥ t .
Our main theorem also applies to sketches that aim to approximate any p -norm. A randomized sketch Z for the p -approximation problem depends only on a subspace A ⊆ n and given x ∈ n aims to output a number Z(x) satisfying x p Z(x) C · x p . Corollary 4.2. Let 1 p ∞. Let Z be a randomized sketching algorithm for approximating the p -norm which uses a subspace of dimension at most n − O(log(Cn)). Then, there is an algorithm which, with constant probability, given only poly(Cn) oracle queries to Z(x), finds a vector x ∈ n which violates x p Z(x) C · x p . 4.1 Sparse recovery with an 2 / 2 -guarantee An 2 / 2 sparse recovery algorithm for a given parameter k, is a randomized sketching algorithm which given Ax, outputs a vector x that satisfies the approximation guarantee x − x 2 C x tail(k) 2 . Here x tail(k) denotes x with its top k coordinates (in magnitude) replaced with 0. We will show how to find a vector x which causes the output x to violate the approximation guarantee, for any k 1. Theorem 4.3. Consider any randomized 2 / 2 sparse recovery algorithm with approximation factor C O( √ n), sparsity parameter k 1, and sketching matrix consisting of r = o(n/C 2 ) rows. Then there is an algorithm which, with constant probability, given only oracle access to x finds a vector x ∈ n which violates the approximation guarantee with poly(n) adaptive oracle queries.
Remark 4.4. We note that in general the r = O(n/C 2 ) restriction cannot be improved, at least for small k, since there is an upper bound of O((n/C 2 ) · k log(n/k)). Indeed, with O(k log(n/k)) rows, there is a deterministic procedure to compute x with x − x 2 2 4 x tail(k) 2 1 . By splitting the coordinates of x into n/C 2 blocks x 1 , . . . , x n/C 2 and applying this procedure on each block, the total squared error is 4 j x j tail(k)
Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for k = 1, since extending the theorem to larger k can be done by appending k − 1 additional coordinates to the query vector, each of value +∞. We will prove the theorem for each possible fixing of the randomness of function f , and so we can assume the function f is deterministic.
We use the sparse recovery algorithm Alg to build an algorithm Alg for the GapNorm(B) problem for some value of B = Θ(n). We will use Theorem 4.1 to argue that with constant probability, Alg must have failed on some query in the attack. We use that in each round poly(n) queries x are drawn from a subspace Gaussian family G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ), for certain V ⊥ and σ which are chosen by the attacking algorithm, and vary throughout the course of the attack. Further, we use that the function f can depend on V ⊥ .
In a given round in the simulation, we have a subspace V ⊥ . Let U = V ⊥ ∩ A with dimension r r. Let
where κ > 0 is a sufficiently small constant to be determined. Notice that tr(P V ⊥ ) n − r and e i P V ⊥ e i 1 for all i. The following is a simple application of Markov's bound.
Lemma 4.5. Let x = 1 − α/C 2 for a constant α > 0. The number z of indices i for which e i P V ⊥ e i is larger than x is at least n − C 2 r/α.
By Lemma 4.5, for appropriate r βn/C 2 , where β > 0 is a sufficiently small positive constant depending on κ, we have that |S | 2n/3, which holds at any round in the attack since tr(P V ⊥ ) is always at least n − r.
The attack:
We design a function f (Ax), which is allowed and will depend on V ⊥ (as well as A), to solve Gap-Norm(B). Our reduction is deterministic. Here x ∼ G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) is a query generated during the attack given by Theorem 4.1.
Given Ax, the algorithm Alg first computes the set S with |S | 2n/3 with e i P V ⊥ e i
Given V ⊥ and Ax (and A), Alg can compute Ay i = Ax + 4C √ nAP V ⊥ e i . Let z i be the output of Alg run on input Ay i , for each i ∈ S . If |z i i | C √ n for all i ∈ S , then Alg sets f (x) = 0, otherwise f (x) = 1. We assume for all queries x and all σ chosen during the attack, that x 2 2 ∈ [nσ 2 /2, 2nσ 2 ], which happens with probability 1 − 1/n ω(1) by standard concentration bounds for the χ 2 -distribution. To analyze this reduction, we distinguish two cases for which we require correctness for f . Case 1: x 2 2 < 4n. By concentration bounds of the χ 2 -distribution, we can assume σ 2 8. Let i ∈ S and consider y i . Then, y i tail(1) 2
n. Notice that (e T i P V ⊥ e i )e i has support on a single coordinate, whereas P V ⊥ e i may have support on all n coordinates. By correctness of Alg, for the output z i of Alg, we have
This implies that z i i must be at least C √ n. Indeed, otherwise we would have
contradicting (11) for κ a sufficiently small constant ( and C at least a sufficiently large constant, so that |x i | 2 √ n is small compared to C √ n, which we can assume since it only weakens the correctness requirement of Alg).
Note that we can assume Alg is correct on a query x ∼ G(V ⊥ , σ) (as otherwise we are already done), Hence, z i i must be at least C √ n simultaneously for every i ∈ S , with probability at least 1 − 1/n s for arbitrarily large s. We thus have: 100Bn, for a parameter B = Θ(n). Recall that x is obtained by sampling g 1 ∼ N(0, σ 2 ) n , g 2 ∼ N(0, 1/4) n , and setting x = P V ⊥ g 1 + g 2 . Recall that U = V ⊥ ∩ A, so that we have P A x = P U g 1 + P A g 2 . We can assume that σ 2 B 8 , as mentioned above, by tail bounds on the χ 2 -distribution.
Associate U with an r × n orthonormal matrix (r r) whose rows span U. Since the rows of U are orthonormal, U 2 F r , and so by averaging, for at least 2n/3 of its columns U j , we have U j 2 2 3r /n 3r/n. Let T = { j | U j 2 2 3r/n}. Fix a j ∈ T , and consider y = x+4C √ nP V ⊥ e j . For x ∼ G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ), we start by upper bounding the variation distance between the distributions of random variables P A x = P U g 1 + P A g 2 and P A y = P A x + 4C √ nP A · P V ⊥ e j = P U g 1 + 4C √ nP U e j + P A g 2 . The variation distance cannot decrease by fixing g 2 , so it suffices to upper bound the variation distance between P U g 1 and P U g 1 + 4C
√ nP U e j . Since P U is a projection matrix, there is a 1-to-1 map from these distributions to Ug 1 and Ug 1 + 4C √ nUe j , so we upper bound the variation distance between the latter two distributions.
By rotational invariance of the Gaussian distribution, Ug 1 ∼ N(0, σ 2 Id r ), while Ug 1 + 4C √ nUe j ∼ N(4C √ nU j , σ 2 Id r ), where U j is the j-th column of U. Applying Fact 2.13, and using σ 2 B/8,
, which is at most , and so the variation distance between the distributions of random variables P A (x+4C √ nP V ⊥ e j ) and
. For any constant γ > 0, we can choose the constant β sufficiently small so that for B = γ 2 n, this variation distance is at most 1/100. We fix such a β, for a γ to be determined below. Fix an i ∈ S ∩ T . Consider the output z i of Alg given Ay i . Using that x 2 10 √ Bn = 10γn, we have y i tail(1) 2 y i − 4C √ n(e T i P V ⊥ e i )e i 2 x 2 + 4C √ n(1 − (e i P V ⊥ e i ) 2 ) 1/2 10γn + 4C √ n(1 − ( 1 − κ 2 /C 2 ) 2 ) 1/2 10γn + 4κ √ n.
If Alg succeeds, z i 2 y i 2 + C y i tail(1) 2
√ n ζCn, where ζ > 0 is a constant that can be made arbitrarily small by making γ > 0 arbitrarily small (and assuming n large enough). Hence, z i 2 2 ζ 2 C 2 n 2 . It follows that |z i j | C √ n for at most ζ 2 n values of j. Now we use the following facts if Alg succeeds.
(1) |S | 2n/3; (2) |T | 2n/3; (3) for all i, z i contains at most ζ 2 n values of j for which |z i j | C √ n; (4) for any j, j ∈ T , the variation distance between the distributions of random variables P A (x + 4C √ nP V ⊥ e j ) and P A (x + 4C √ nP V ⊥ e j ) is at most 1/100. The first and second conditions imply that |S ∩ T | 2n/3 − n/3 = n/3. The third and fourth conditions imply that for any i ∈ S ∩ T , if Alg succeeds (which we can assume), then x∼G(V ⊥ ,σ 2 ) |z i i | C 
Wrap-up: We have built a function f for Gap-Norm(B) which has distributional error less than 1/10 on G(V ⊥ , σ 2 ) for any V ⊥ and σ chosen throughout the course of the attack, whenever x 2 2 < 4n or Bn/4
x 2   2 100Bn. The reduction is deterministic and holds for each setting of the randomness of f . It follows by Theorem 4.1, that with constant probability, with poly(n) adaptive oracle queries to f , we will find a strong failure certificate (V, σ 2 ) for f (for each fixing of its randomness). In this case, either σ 2 > B/2 and g∼G(V ⊥ ,σ 2 ) { f (g) = 1} 2/3, which would violate (13), or σ 2 2 and g∼G(V ⊥ ,σ 2 ) { f (g) 0} 1/3, which would violate (12) . It follows that our assumption that the compressed sensing algorithm Alg succeeded on all queries made was false, which implies that we have found a query to Alg violating its approximation guarantee. This completes the proof.
